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RECENT FOURTH CIRCUIT ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE
BRIAN M. HENDRICKS*
Each year, the staff of the William and Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review prepares a detailed summary of the major
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that
implicate environmental law and policy. In prior editions of the
Review, this has been referred to as the Fourth Circuit Summary.
This practice is part of the Journal's ongoing effort to serve
practicing attorneys and members of the academic community. The
Editors selected the cases that follow from the body of environmen-
tal cases decided in the Fourth Circuit during 2005.1
I. CLEAN WATER ACT: UNITED STATES V. LAPTEFF2 AND
AMERICAN CANOE ASSOCIATION V. MURPHY FARMS, INC.
3
In September of 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in United States v. Lapteff, a
case in which a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia convicted the defendant for failing to comply
* Brian M. Hendricks is a 2006 J.D. candidate attending the William and Mary
School of Law. He previously received a B.A. in Political Science and Economics
from Augustana College and a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Thomas
Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary. During
the 2005-2006 academic year, he served as the Executive Editor of the William
and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review.
' The Fourth Circuit Summary prepared for Volume 29 contained an analysis of
Harper v. West Virginia Public Service Commission, 396 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2005),
decided in January of 2005. For an analysis of Harper, see Samuel R. Brumberg
& Christopher D. Supino, Fourth Circuit Summary, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'y REV. 849, 849-51 (2005).
2 United States v. Lapteff, No. 03-4850, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28333 (4th Cir.
Sept. 19, 2005) (unpublished opinion).
' Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 412 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2005).
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with requirements relating to the operation of a wastewater
treatment facility for Christchurch School.4 The defendant appealed
his conviction, arguing that the District Court improperly admitted
evidence of "other crimes," including a previous conviction for filing
a false tax return, and that the district court made findings of fact
for sentencing purposes not reviewed by the jury, which violated
established Supreme Court precedent.5 The appeal is noteworthy
because the holding provides that prior conduct relating to the
environment may be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecu-
tions, and because it illustrates the role that the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Booker,' will continue to play in
reshaping how lower courts determine sentences in light of the
decision to change the United States Sentencing Guidelines from a
mandatory framework to an advisory tool.7
In 1997, Christchurch School entered into an arrangement
with Analytech, Inc. to manage the school's wastewater facility.'
From April of 1997 through March of 2002, Alexander Lapteff
operated the facility as an agent for Analytech in a manner that
violated the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Permit ("the permit") issued to Christchurch School.9 Investigators
from the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ")
began observing the conduct of Lapteff and Analytech in late 2001,
and found a number of ongoing violations of the permit. ° In early
4 Lapteff, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28833, at **2-3 (noting that after a federal
grand jury returned an eighteen count indictment against the defendant, a jury
ultimately convicted him of six charges and a lesser included offense of negligent
failure to maintain and properly operate a sewage treatment facility).
5 Id. at **2.
6 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 22 (2005).
7 See Brian Hendricks, In Pursuit of Environmental Regulatory Compliance:
Should We Flex the 'Public Trust'Enhancement Muscle?, 30WM. &MARYENVTL.
L. & POLY REV. 153, 161-63 (2005) (discussing the recent decision in Booker in
which the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing guidelines that
require courts to make findings of fact, not otherwise presented to a jury,
violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
'See Lapteff, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28833, at **3.
9 Id. at **4.
'0 Id. at **3-4.
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2002, an investigator from DEQ discovered discrepancies between
the log book entries detailing daily maintenance activities at the
facility and the activities that investigators actually observed. 1
Investigators also discovered that a number of log books were
missing from the facility.
12
At trial, prosecutors offered information relating to past
misconduct by the defendant into evidence. Specifically, prosecu-
tors offered (1) a 1982 communication between the Virginia State
Water Control Board and Lapteff admonishing him for withholding
data from a water quality report, 3 (2) information relating to a
1991 revocation of Lapteffs Class I wastewater operating license
as the result of a mistaken chlorine discharge, 4 (3) and Lapteffs
1992 conviction for filing a false tax return, which the prosecution
successfully argued bore on the current charges and could be used
for impeachment purposes because it was a conviction for a crime
involving dishonesty or false statements. 5 The jury convicted
Lapteff on three counts of making false statements in a log book,
two counts of making false statements in a discharge monitoring
report, one count of failure to maintain proper records relating to
monitoring activities, and one count of negligent failure to
maintain and properly operate a sewage treatment facility."6 The
district court sentenced Lapteff to thirty-six months in prison
followed by a year of supervised release, $5,000 in fines, and a
$625 special assessment. 7
11 Id. at **4.12 Id. at **5.
" The communication from the Virginia State Water Control Board was a letter
from Eugenia Grandstaff informing Lapteff that his report omitted data on the
reason for performing a specific water quality test and that misrepresenting
data, or failing to report data, was a falsification of records and a criminal
offense. Id. at **7.
14 Defense counsel argued that admitting evidence relating to the chlorine
discharge, which resulted in a significant "fish kill," was "emotive and unfairly
inflamed the passions of the jury." Id. at **9.15 See Lapteff, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28833, at * 11.
16 Id. at **2.
17Id.
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Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found that all of the evidence admitted against Lapteff met the
requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b).18
Notably, the government conceded that Lapteff's actual sentence
violated the holding in Booker because it was imposed under a
mandatory sentencing regime.' 9 The court affirmed the conviction
and remanded for sentencing consistent with the holding in
Booker.2° The re-sentencing is noteworthy because it may provide an
indication of how judges operating under advisory sentencing
guidelines, at least in the Fourth Circuit, will use information
relating to defendant conduct in crafting sentences for environmen-
tal crimes. Prior to the Booker decision, judges would look to specific
sections of the United States Sentencing Guidelines that related to
environmental crimes, including §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.4 and § 2Q2.1, to
determine if individual defendant conduct merited an upward or
downward sentencing adjustment.21 The Lapteff decision reenforces
the idea that judges can no longer simply rely upon the sentencing
guidelines, but must instead adhere to the Booker framework to
avoid sentencing remands.
In May of 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit heard arguments in an appeal from ajudgement of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina in which
the court ruled that a plaintiff group met the statutory require-
ments22 necessary to file a citizen suit for violations of the Clean
Water Act. 23 This appeal resulted from a narrow issue remaining
18 See id. at **7.
19 Id. at **14.
20 Id. at **15.
21 See Hendricks, supra note 7, at 160 and nn.44-45 (discussing the sentencing
guidelines relating to environmental crimes and the availability of conduct-
specific sentencing adjustments).
22 Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 412 F.3d 536,537 (4th Cir. 2005)
(Am. Canoe Ass'n II).
23 Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, appearing at 33 U.S.C.S. § 1365(a)
(LexisNexis 2006) permits a citizen group to bring a suit if they allege that there
is either a state of continuous or intermittent violations, which is essentially a
reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.
Am. Canoe Ass'n 11, 412 F.3d at 539.
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from lengthy prior litigation, which is detailed inAmerican Canoe
Association, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 509-12 (4th
Cir. 2003).24 The citizen groups involved in this decision originally
filed suit against Murphy Farms, Inc. and D.B. Farms of Rosehill
in 1998, arguing that the farms lacked a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit but nevertheless engaged in
the practice of spilling swine wastewater into North Carolina
rivers. 25 The United States government intervened in subsequent
litigation and, as a result, the parties entered into a consent
decree.26 At the time, the ability of the citizen groups to participate
in the consent decree, which would provide them with attorney's
fees, remained contingent on their ability to show that they had
standing to file their initial complaint.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina heard the initial request of the citizen groups to
establish standing and ruled that the groups had satisfied both the
jurisdictional requirements for bringing a suit and possessed Article
III standing.28 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
initially ruled that the district court's finding with respect to Article
III standing was proper, but remanded the case for factual findings
relating to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements of
Section 505(a).29 The district court held on remand that the facts
presented by the citizen groups established that "there was a
continuing risk of recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations
24 Id. at 537.
25Id.
26Id.
27 Id. (noting that to show standing, the citizens groups needed to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act for bringing a
citizen suit).28 Am. Canoe Ass'n 11, 412 F.3d at 537. Note that Article III standing refers to
the subject matter jurisdiction of a court under Article III of the United States
Constitution. See Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505,
515, 517-18, 520-21 (4th Cir. 2003) (Am. Canoe Ass'n I) (discussing Article III
standing generally and detailing the need to demonstrate personal injury and
traceability to satisfy standing under Article III; and finding that the citizen
groups satisfied the elements necessary to acquire Article III standing).29 Id.
2006] 775
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at the time [the citizen groups] filed [their] complaint" and that as
a result, the citizen groups had satisfied the jurisdictional require-
ments to bring a citizen suit.
30
On remand, the district court examined five specific spill
events in which the defendants "discharged or nearly discharged"
swine wastewater into a nearby waterway and sprayed the
wastewater onto agricultural fields as fertilizer.3' Two of the spills
occurred before the filing of the complaint, while the other three
occurred after the filing of the complaint. In each of the five spill
events, the court ruled that "there were fewer responsible and
competent land techs employed and/or on duty than were required
to operate the hog waste management system in compliance with
the Clean Water Act."3 3 The personnel shortage satisfied the
district court that there was a risk of recurrence, allowing the
citizen groups to meet the jurisdictional requirements.34
In reviewing the defendants' objections to the district court's
finding of jurisdiction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reiterated its prior holdings. Speaking about the need for a
citizen group to prove that there is an ongoing violation, the court
quoted from its holding in Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988):
Citizen-plaintiffs may accomplish this [proof of an
ongoing violation] either (1) by proving violations
that continue on or after the date the complaint is
filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing
likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic
violations. Intermittent or sporadic violations do not
3 Am. CanoeAss'n II, 412 F.3d at 538 (quotingAm. CanoeAss'n I, 326 F.3d 505).
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 3 Id. (quoting Am. Canoe Ass'n I).
3 4 Id.
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cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no
real likelihood of repetition.35
The occurrence of the three post-complaint spills satisfied both the
district court and the appellate court that the defendants had not
effectively eliminated the "real likelihood of repetition" of Clean
Water Act violations.3 6 Notably, the court passed on the opportu-
nity to pronounce whether a single post-complaint occurrence is
sufficient to establish an on going violation.37
The defendants also objected to the fact that, in their view,
the district court failed to credit their "good-faith remedial efforts"
to correct the causal factors that produced the spills.3" The court
rejected this argument, claiming that the defendants proposed that
"we graft an exemption onto the jurisdictional requirements of
section 505(a) to shield from suit those past violators who have
undertaken good-faith remedial efforts . . . ." The court cited to
the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,.484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987), in which
the Supreme Court pronounced that a defendant remains a
violator while there exists an actual likelihood of recurring
violations, essentially regardless of what the defendant has done
to reduce the risk or lessen his current "subjective culpability for
that risk."40
The ultimate holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in this case essentially reaffirms two important and
notable points. A citizen group wishing to file a complaint for
violations of the Clean Water Act may simply follow the road map
laid out by the court during the course of the American Canoe
litigation and show that there is a threat of ongoing violations for
which it seeks recognition to sue. Second, and perhaps more
troubling, good-faith remedial efforts to correct the causes of Clean
35 Id. at 539 (alteration in original).
" Am. Canoe Ass'n 11, 412 F.3d at 539.
3 7 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 540.
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Water Act violations will not shield a defendant from subsequent
suit in the event future violations occur. That is, once a defendant
is accused of past violations through a complaint, even taking
corrective actions will not stave off liability if at least one subse-
quent violation occurs because that subsequent violation allows a
citizen group to argue that a "a continuing likelihood of recurrence"
exists.4 ' The impact of such a position on the number of companies
willing to undertake voluntary remediation may be quite significant.
II. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: NATIONAL
AUDUBON SOCIETY V. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAvY4
2
A collection of concerned environmental groups and two
counties filed suit against the Department of the Navy and several
federal officials in connection with the proposed construction of a
military landing field in Washington and Beaufort Counties in
North Carolina.4 3 The Navy undertook an effort to modernize its
fighter aircraft and made a decision to station its new F/A-18 E/F
Super Hornet aircraft on the East coast to replace older models. 4
This decision required the Navy to determine where to house the
aircraft and where to operate an Outlying Landing Field ("OLF")
to conduct Field Carrier Landing Practice.4"
Throughout 2002 and 2003, the Navy attempted to meet the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),
particularly the requirements relating to the preparation of
Environmental Impact Statements ("EIS").' The Navy released a
draft EIS in August of 2002 for public comment in which it recom-
mended "Site C" in Beaufort and Washington Counties as one of the
two preferred sites for the OLF.47 In July of 2003, the Navy issued
41 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2005).
43 Id. at 183.
4Id. at 181.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 182.
47 Id.
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its final EIS analyzing eight different "home basing alternatives"
and six "potential OLF siting alternatives."' The Navy's Record of
Decision set forth its final conclusions with respect to placement
issues in September of 2003.' 9 The final "homebasing decision" was
alternative six, which involved stationing eight Super Hornet fleet
squadrons and a Fleet Replacement Squadron at Naval Air Stations
Oceana in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and two squadrons at the
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point in Havelock, North
Carolina.5 ° The ultimate siting for the OLF placed it within five
miles of the Pocosin Lakes National Wildlife Refuge ("NWR").51 The
plaintiffs, a number of concerned environmental groups and both
Beaufort and Washington Counties, filed suit claiming that the
Navy failed to follow the requirements of NEPA because they failed
to "adequately assess the environmental impacts of its decision to
place an OLF.. ." at the selected site.52
The plaintiffs alleged that the Navy's siting decision "threatens
the waterfowl at the NWR and the eco-tourism to the counties that
the NWR provides."53 In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the
presence of the aircraft in NWR might lead to "flush[ing]" the birds
causing them to take flight, actual striking of the birds in flight, and
other alterations to the nesting and feeding behaviors of the birds,
leading to a reduction in their populations.' The district court
entered an injunction to halt efforts by the Navy to advance the
planned OLF, stating that the Navy's EIS "did not adequately
address the impacts of an OLF at [Slite C on migratory waterfowl."55
The Navy appealed the district court decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit arguing that the Navy had complied
43 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 422 F.3d at 182.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 182-83 (noting that NWR is a 115,000-acre wetlands area "highly
populated by nature and thinly populated by man" and was "established
specifically as an inviolate waterfowl sanctuary").
52 Id. at 183.
53 Id.
4 Id.
55Nat'l Audubon Socy', 422 F.3d at 183.
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with NEPA and that the district court's grant of a permanent
injunction was an improper remedy.56
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that
NEPA is a procedural statute requiring an agency to take a "hard
look" at environmental impacts before taking major actions.57 The
court also noted that the core provision of NEPA compels an
agency of the federal government to:
[Include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on-(i)the environmental impact
of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed
action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.5"
The foregoing requires the preparation of an EIS, which the court
noted must occur in stages that provide the opportunity for
feedback from the general public and other agencies.59 In this
particular case, the Navy argued that each of the procedural steps
had been followed and that therefore the district court erred in
finding that the Navy failed to comply with NEPA.6 °
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit began its
review of the district court decision by noting that "[wlhat consti-
56 Id.
57 Id. at 184.58 Id. (quoting the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (2000)).
59 See id. at 185.
60 See id.
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tutes a 'hard look' cannot be outlined with rule-like precision."61
The court continued by stating that "[a]t the least, however, it
encompasses a thorough investigation into the environmental
impacts of an agency's action and a candid acknowledgment of the
risks that those impacts entail."62 While the court notes that it
cannot use its review of an agency decision as a "guise for second-
guessing" decisions within an agency's discretion, it eschews the
opportunity to become a "rubber stamp."63 Ultimately, the court
looked to the congressional expression made in the legislation
creating the NWR at Pocosin Lakes to provide "unique opportuni-
ties for observing and interpreting the biological richness of the
region's estuaries and wetlands."' According to the court, the
Navy's hard look needed to take care to "evaluate how its actions
will affect the unique biological features of this congressionally
protected area."65 Ultimately, the Navy failed to satisfy the court
that it met the hard look standard and the court noted that none
of the Navy's deficiencies alone would invalidate the EIS but that
taken together, the deficiencies indicate the Navy did not conduct
a hard look analysis.66 As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant finding that
the Navy failed to comply with NEPA but vacated the injunction
and remanded the case with instructions to narrow the injunction
in accordance with the decision.67
Effectively, the decision in this case reaffirms the Fourth
Circuit's position that in conducting a hard look analysis, the
61 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 422 F.3d at 185.
62 id.
63 Id.
6Id. at 187.
65 Id.
61 See id. The court goes into great detail in the balance of its opinion outlining
the major components of the Navy's EIS and how each component failed to meet
requirements of NEPA. Examples include reaching the conclusion that the OLF
citing would have only a minor impact on snow geese and tundra swans without
conducting detailed analysis on the species and the properties of the
surrounding habitat. Id.67Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 422 F.3d at 207.
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agency must follow the steps required by NEPA, including properly
prepared EIS documents, and that the analysis must not have
"limited the choice of reasonable alternatives."" In this particular
case, the Navy appeared overzealous in its execution and went
through the process of preparing the EIS and subsequent docu-
ments without engaging in the type of thorough and deliberate
analysis required to satisfy NEPA.
III. CLEAN AIR ACT: UNITED STATES V. DUKE ENERGY CORP. 6 9
In February of 2004 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in United States v. Duke
Energy.7" The United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") brought an enforcement action against Duke Energy,
alleging that on numerous occasions Duke Energy modified the
furnaces at several of its plants without obtaining the necessary
permits, a violation of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD") provisions of the Clean Air Act.7' The district court granted
summary judgement to Duke Energy and the EPA appealed.72
From 1988 to 2000, Duke Energy carried on a plant modern-
ization program consisting of twenty-nine projects on its coal-fired
generating units.7" The projects, consisting largely of replacing or
redesigning boiler tube assemblies, would extend the life of the
generating facilities and allow the units to stay in use for longer
periods each day.74 Duke Energy did not apply for, or receive,
permits from the EPA for any of these projects.75 In December of
2000, the government filed suit alleging that the life extension
projects constituted "major modifications" under the PSD statutory
68 Id. at 206 (quoting 40 C.F.R. §1506.1(a)(2) (2005)).
69 United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 542.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 544.
14 See id.
75 Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d at 544.
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provisions and regulations and that Duke Energy needed permits
for these modifications.76
The EPA argued that by comparing the "actual pre-project
emissions from a unit to the projected post-project emissions," the
actual yearly emissions would increase as a result of the projects
because the plants would each run for more hours each day.77 Duke
Energy argued that the projects did not increase the actual emis-
sions of each unit for PSD purposes because a net emissions increase
would only result if there was an increase in the hourly rate of
emissions.7' Duke Energy reasoned that since its projects did not
ultimately raise the emissions above pre-project levels, it did not
need to obtain permits. 79 The district court ruled that a modification
subject to PSD only occurs when the post-project hourly emissions
increase."0 The district court also stated that the EPA's interpreta-
tion of the PSD regulations is at odds with the plain language of the
regulations because it excludes a much smaller group of projects
from the definition of "major modification."8 '
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that
where an agency's interpretation of its regulations is at issue, a
court must undertake a "modified Chevron analysis." 2 The EPA
argued that the definition of the term "modification" contained in
the PSD was not identical to that contained in the New Source
Performance Standards ("NSPS"), a complimentary provision also
contained in the Clean Air Act. 3 Under the modified Chevron
76 d.
77Id.
7 s Id. at 544-45.
79 Id. at 545.
801d.
8' Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d at 545.
2 Id. at 546 (noting that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), provides that a court needs to determine "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue" (citation omitted)). Only where
a statute is silent or ambiguous on the point at issue is Congress deemed to have
delegated discretion to the agency to clarify the matter in its regulations. Id.
13 The New Source Performance Standards provisions are located at 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 7411 (LexisNexis 2006). Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d at 542.
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analysis, the court felt that Congress had indeed "directly spoken
to the precise question at issue," which in this case was the correct
interpretation of the statutory term "modification." 4 Further, the
court held that the "presumption of uniform usage [of the term
modification] has become effectively irrebutable," and as a result,
the EPA could not interpret the term differently in applying the
PSD provisions to Duke Energy's modernization program.8 5 The
differing purposes of the PSD and the NSPS cannot effectively
override a congressional mandate for the consistent application of
the term "modification."8
6
The EPA promulgated its NSPS regulations such that the
term "modification" applies only to the extent that a project
increases the hourly rate of emissions and the court held that the
EPA must also interpret its PSD regulations in this manner.8 7 If
the EPA wants to alter this regulatory interpretation, the court
notes that it may do so through proper rulemaking procedures, but
until it does so it must interpret and apply the PSD and NSPS
regulations defining "modification" congruently.8
As a practical matter, the holding in this case provides
needed clarification to entities seeking to make alterations or
undertake projects on pollution-emitting facilities. The EPA is
required to apply its PSD and NSPS regulations consistently and
may only require an entity to secure permits under PSD if the
project will increase the hourly rate of emissions of the facility.
84 Id. at 546.
85 Id. at 550.
" Duke Energy Corp., 411 F.3d at 550.
87 Id.
88Id.
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